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We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowl-
edge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First,
we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can
invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive com-
munication (listening). This leads to a full characterization of information and
influence flows. Second, we show that when the coordination motive dominates
the adaptation motive, the influence of an agent on all his peers is approximately
proportional to his eigenvector centrality. Third, we use our results to explain or-
ganizational phenomena such as the emergence of work “cliques,” the adoption
of human resources practices that foster communication (especially active com-
munication), and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual influence.
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1. Introduction
Communication is one of the defining characteristics of humans. A large part of our
day is spent on various media, ranging from having informal conversations to writing
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formal reports, from exchanging email messages to participating in social media. This
is true in social contexts as well as in the workplace. Corporate leaders spend upwards
of 80 percent of their work time on communication-centered activities (Mintzberg 1973,
Bandiera et al. 2011)
The endogeneity of communication patterns should lie at the center of a theory of
organization (Arrow 1974). We have some control of to whom we decide to speak, email,
or telephone. As communication requires time, we are selective and instrumental in how
much we invest in communicating with different agents. As Simon (1986) noted, “If we
record the frequency of communication between different nodes, we [will] find that the
pattern is not uniform but highly structured. In fact, the pattern of communication fre-
quencies [should] reflect, approximately, the pattern of authority.” The objective of this
paper is to develop a model of endogenous costly communication and to use it to un-
derstand influence patterns.
The model can be sketched as follows. There are a number of agents who face local
uncertainty (for simplicity, local states are assumed to be mutually independent). Each
agent observes the realization of his local state and must take an action. The payoff of
each agent depends on his local state, his own action, and the action of other agents.
For every pair of agents, action interdependence is measured as a continuous inten-
sity and it can be asymmetric (agent A places more importance on coordinating with B
than with C) and directed (agent A wants to coordinate with B more than B wants to
coordinate with A).
Before choosing his action, an agent can engage in communication. He can inform
other agents about his own state of the world and he can gather information about other
agents’ states of the world.1 Formally, the agent selects a vector of active communica-
tion intensities and a vector of passive communication intensities. The precision of the
communication of one agent to another is then determined by how much the sender
invests in active communication (talking) and how much the receiver invests in passive
communication (listening). Both types of communication are costly, and the cost is an
increasing and convex function of communication intensity. In this model, the intensity
of communication and influence (how much an agent’s state influences another agent’s
action) is represented by continuous variables. This allows us to study varying degrees
of interpersonal ties, as suggested by the sociological literature (Granovetter 1973).
Our analysis is divided in three parts. We first characterize communication patterns
and individual decisions in equilibrium. We show that games in the class we consider
have a unique equilibrium in linear strategies, namely one where the action of each
agent is a linear function of his own signal and the signal that he receives from other
agents.
These games feature various levels of strategic interaction. Active communication,
passive communication, and decision influence are strategic complements. Alice in-
vests in talking to Bob because she hopes that Bob will invest in listening to her and will
1In our setup, which allows for one round of communication only, there is no loss of generality in as-
suming that communication only relates to the observed state of the world. Things would be different if we
allowed for more than one round.
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use the information he has received to coordinate his action’s with Alice’s state, some-
thing that would benefit Alice. Bob is influenced by the signal he receives from Alice
because he has invested in listening and he thinks that she has invested in active com-
munication; hence, the signal should be valuable in coordinating his action with hers.
With more than two agents, these interactions may be indirect. Alice and Carol are not
interested in coordinating their actions per se, but they both want to coordinate with
Bob. In equilibrium they might invest in communicating with each other, in the knowl-
edge that Bob’s action will be affected by their states.
One way to find the fixed point of this set of interactions is to proceed iteratively,
at each step taking into account a higher level of interactions. Our equilibrium cor-
responds to the limit of this iterative process. In equilibrium, a simple linear relation
describes active and passive communication from one agent to the other as a linear
function of how much the latter is influenced by information he receives. In turn, influ-
ence coefficients are determined jointly for all agents as a linear system. This tractable
equilibrium characterization is useful to draw lessons on patterns of communication
and influence.
In the second part of the paper, we use the main characterization result to explore
patterns of communication and influence. As one would expect, we can prove that
communication flows and influence relations between two agents become stronger if
these agents have stronger exogenous interaction ties. Less obvious are indirect effects,
namely how communication between two agents changes when other interaction ties
change. Suppose a subset of workers is bound by strong exogenous ties: in the labor
sociology language, a work “clique” exists (Dalton 1959). We show the existence of an in-
sularity effect, pushing the subset of workers to reduce their interest in talking to the out-
side world, and an opposite reinforcement effect, whereby outsiders are keen to under-
stand what goes on in the subset. Active and passive communication intensities move
in opposite directions. The overall effect on influence from the subset to the rest of the
workers is positive at first when they have relatively weak ties, but it turns to negative
when the ties become sufficiently strong.
In our noncooperative setup, communication and influence is generally inefficiently
low. Agents do not internalize the benefit that investment in communication generates
for other agents. This is true for both active and passive communication. However, play-
ers tend to underinvest, in relative terms, more in active communication than in passive
communication. To see this, suppose that active and passive communication have the
same cost. A planner would choose the same level of active and passive communication.
Yet, with n > 2, agents spend less on active communication. The benefit of listening is
direct: the receiver incorporates the information in his decision-making. The benefit of
speaking is indirect: the sender hopes that the receiver will incorporate the information
he receives in his decision-making. We relate these results to the evidence on the effect
on firm performance of introducing innovative human resources management (HRM)
practices (Ichniowski et al. 1997).
In the third and last part of the paper, we ask which agents are most influential over-
all. We define the global influence of an agent as the aggregate effect that a marginal
change in the agent’s local state has on other agents’ actions. In our setting, global
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influence is an equilibrium variable, which is, in turn, jointly determined by three
other equilibrium phenomena: active communication, passive communication, and
decision-making.
We uncover a connection between global influence and eigenvector centrality. In
the quadratic setting we study, each agent cares about adaptation (fitting his action to
his own local state) and coordination (fitting his action to other agents’ actions). We
show that as the coordination motive becomes more and more important, the vector of
global influences defined above tends to the vector of eigenvector centralities computed
on a primitive of the problem: the matrix of directed interaction payoffs. This can be
seen as an approximation result. In a game where coordination is much more important
than adaptation, the relative global influence of every agent is well approximated by his
eigenvector centrality. Given the simplicity of eigenvector measures, our result is useful
for characterizing the asymptotic properties of the games we study.
This result relates to Ballester et al. (2006). They analyze a class of complete informa-
tion games with quadratic payoffs and pairwise dependent strategic complementarities,
and they show that in the equilibrium of these games, the effort exerted by each agent
strongly depends on his position in the network of relations. In particular, this effort is
proportional to his Bonacich index, a centrality measure constructed by summing paths
emanating from one agent (with a decay factor). In our game, an agent’s influence can
be expressed as a linear function of Bonacich centralities and this fact is used in the
proof of Theorem 5.2
We apply the asymptotic equivalence result to study influence in hierarchical struc-
tures. Weber’s top-down view of optimal bureaucracies came into question when em-
pirical studies started showing that in the presence of conflicts of interest, the most in-
fluential members of an organization are often found at mid-level rather than at the top.
Armed with the asymptotic correspondence between influence and eigenvector central-
ity, we first show that the Weberian view holds in a regular hierarchy, namely one where
exogenous interaction patterns repeat themselves at every level. In the equilibrium of
our communication game, a superior and his subordinates invest in reciprocal commu-
nication. Because of the tree-like nature of the hierarchy, this implies that the global
influence of an agent is greater, the higher the agent is in the organization. However,
Weber’s monotonicity breaks down when there are groups of agents with stronger ties.
In that case, as Dalton predicted, the most influential members of the organization are
the top people within their “clique.” The complementarity between interaction, com-
munication, and influence means that the head of the clique is more influential, not
only toward his subordinates, but also toward his superior. This corresponds to Dalton’s
observation that the most influential agents are often low-level managers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Following the literature review, Sec-
tion 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the first main result of the paper: the
equilibrium characterization theorem. Section 4 uses the characterization theorem for
2The technical connection between our two papers is discussed in detail in the remarks after Theorem 5.
The obvious difference is that in Ballester et al. (2006), there is no information asymmetry and, hence,
communication, and that they do not discuss eigenvector centrality.
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comparative statics and welfare analysis, with an emphasis on the role of complemen-
tarities, both between communication and decisions, and between active and passive
communication. Section 5 reports the second main result—the asymptotic equivalence
between agent’s influence and the eigenvector centrality—and applies it to Dalton’s hi-
erarchies. Section 6 concludes by suggesting future avenues of research. All proofs are
given in the Appendix.
A supplementary file available on the journal website, http://econtheory.org/supp/
1468/supplement.pdf, provides an array of robustness checks and additional results: al-
ternative time line, equilibrium uniqueness, ban on communication along certain links,
broadcasting (as opposed to pairwise communication), corner solutions, and additional
comparative statics. These extensions are referenced in the text in informal terms and
proven formally in the supplementary material.
1.1 Literature review
This paper relates to two strands of literature: organizational economics and the eco-
nomics of networks.
In the first strand of literature, there are a number of papers that study endogenous
communication in a variety of settings. Our approach to multiperson decision-making
under asymmetric information, as well as our normal-quadratic formulation, is inspired
by Marschak and Radner’s (1972) team theory. Some recent papers (Dessein and San-
tos 2006, Alonso et al. 2008, Rantakari 2008, Dessein et al. 2013) explore decentralized
decision-making within organizations. Besides sharing their normal-quadratic setup,
we are also interested in the trade-off between adaptation and coordination. We are
particularly close to three models of endogenous costly communication between two
agents.
In Dessein and Santos (2006), an agent can send a signal about his local state to the
other agent, and the precision of the signal is endogenous.3 They show the existence of
complementarities between communication, adaptation, and job description: in par-
ticular, when communication costs decrease, the organization is more likely to adopt a
new set of organizational practices that include broader tasks and more adaptation.
Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) analyze a model of endogenous costly communica-
tion between a sender and a receiver. As in our model, both active and passive commu-
nication are endogenous and costly, and there are positive externalities (it takes two to
communicate). Dewatripont and Tirole’s communication model has a number of fea-
tures that are absent here, such as the presence of signaling and the possibility of send-
ing “cues,” i.e., information about the sender’s credibility.
Van Zandt (2004) develops a model of endogenous costly communication where sev-
eral agents can transmit information at the same time. This leads to screening costs on
the part of receivers and the potential for “information overload.” Van Zandt examines
3One technical difference is that Dessein and Santos’ (2006) signals are either fully informative or unin-
formative, and precision is defined as the probability that the signal is informative. Here, instead, signals
are normally distributed and the precision is the reciprocal of the variance.
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possible mechanisms for reducing overload—an important problem in modern orga-
nizations. Our paper abstracts from information overload by assuming that receivers
do not face a screening problem (they can always choose not to listen to a particular
sender).
Our contribution with respect to these three papers is to extend endogenous com-
munication to complex architectures. We discuss an array of phenomena that have lim-
ited or no meaning with only two agents, such as cliques, global influence, indirect ef-
fects, the opportunity to encourage active communication, etc.
Following the seminal work of Radner (1993), the literature of organizational eco-
nomics has also studied the role of networks in minimizing human limitations in infor-
mation processing. The works of Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Van Zandt (1999a),
Garicano (2000), Guimerà et al. (2002), and Dodds et al. (2003) highlight the importance
of hierarchies, and more general network structures, to diminish the costs related to
processing information that flows through the network of contacts. This literature is
surveyed by Van Zandt (1999b) and Ioannides (2012). Our work is complementary to
this one, and analyzes how individual payoff complementarities shape both the network
structure of communication and the equilibrium actions.
Crémer et al. (2007) formalize Arrow’s (1974) idea of coding: the medium of commu-
nication used by a group of people (the organizational language) is endogenous and it
determines communication costs. For analytical tractability, in the present model the
communication medium is not modeled explicitly, but it is represented by a communi-
cation cost function.4
Related work can also be found in political economy. Dewan and Myatt (2008) ana-
lyze the role of communication in the interplay of leaders and activists in political par-
ties. Leaders are heterogeneous in two different skills: their ability to interpret which
is the correct policy to promote, and the clarity of communication of their ideas to the
activists. Activists seek to advocate for the correct policy by listening with different in-
tensities to the party leaders. The authors show that, generally, clarity in communica-
tion is the leaders’ ability to induce higher influence on activists’ opinions. Dewan and
Myatt’s interpretation of communication is close to the one we propose in our work: in
a Bayesian game with quadratic payoff functions and normally distributed signals that
represent the messages sent and received, agents can affect the precision of these sig-
nals. Alternatively, the communication protocols and, therefore, the strategic effects
of communication are different in the two models, as well as the questions that are
analyzed.
In the second strand of literature—network economics—the closest contribution is
Calvó-Armengol and de Martí Beltran (2009), who consider a normal-quadratic team-
theoretical setup and study the effect of communication among agents. The authors
provide a full characterization of the decision functions and the equilibrium payoffs
given a communication structure. Calvó-Armengol and de Martí Beltran also study what
the best communication structure is when the overall number of links among agents is
4Crémer (1993) and Prat (2002) study costly endogenous information collection in a team-theoretic set-
ting. Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) examine optimal information choices in a strategic setting. The present
paper is complementary in that it endogenizes communication rather than information collection.
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bounded: they provide sufficient conditions for the optimal communication network to
be a star or the maximum aggregate span network. However, the only choice between
two nodes is no communication or full communication, so the kind of communication
intensity analysis that we perform here is absent.
This paper also adopts a normal-quadratic specification, close to the one in Calvó-
Armengol and de Martí Beltran. The key innovation here is, of course, that commu-
nication is endogenous. We also move away from a team-theoretical framework, we
introduce the idea of communication intensity, and we distinguish between active and
passive communication.5
Our eigenvector centrality result is related to three papers. Golub and Jackson (2010)
study a learning model where agents communicate on a network and process signals
they receive naively. They show that when beliefs converge, the consensus belief is a
weighted average of agents’ initial beliefs and the weights, which correspond to a mea-
sure of global influence, are given by a principal eigenvector of the social network matrix.
Elliott and Golub (2013) study a setting where agents can exert costly effort to generate
nonrival, heterogeneous benefits for other agents and characterize Lindahl outcomes as
the eigenvector centrality action profiles. Golub and Lever (2010) study how eigenvec-
tor centrality of agents in a network changes when initially disconnected groups begin
interacting with each other via a new bridging link. Weak intergroup links can have
arbitrarily large effects on the distribution of centrality.
Hagenbach and Koessler (2010) and Galeotti et al. (2013) also consider, as we do,
strategic endogenous communication in a network game. However, their focus is on
costless, nonverifiable information (cheap talk) when agents may have biases as in
Crawford and Sobel (1982) (see Sobel 2013 for a survey). Our setup is different in that
we focus on costly and verifiable information. The kind of issues we address are thus
entirely different (and complementary).6
With regard to the literature on the formation of (communication) networks, Bloch
and Dutta (2009) study the creation of communication networks with endogenous link
strength. In their model, agents have a fixed resource, for example, time, and have to
decide how to allocate it to create connections with others. The benefits of a connection
depends on the decisions of both agents involved in it. Furthermore, in the spirit of
the connections model introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), an agent obtains
benefits of indirect connections through the more reliable path connecting them with
each one of the agents in the society.
Rogers (2008) analyzes another network formation game in which all agents have a
limited resource available to spend building links with the rest of agents, but differs with
5The literature of information sharing in oligopoly has also considered a normal-quadratic setup. See,
for example, Vives (1984), Gal-Or (1985, 1986), and Raith (1996). Vives (1999) surveys this literature. While
the setup in these papers bears some resemblance to our paper, there are several differences in the analysis,
both because communication is public and, hence, there is no network component, and because the focus
is quite different (industry competition rather than organization economics).
6A point of overlap with Hagenbach and Koessler (2010) is their result that when information is fully veri-
fiable, agents will want to communicate all they know. This corresponds to our setup when communication
costs go to zero.
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the work of Bloch and Dutta in the structure of benefits. In Rogers (2008), the utility of
an agent depends on the utility of each other agent with whom he is directly connected.
This recursive definition of utilities generates indirect effects that spread through in-
direct connections of any length. The author analyzes two games: one in which the
dependency expresses that each agent gives utility to his connections; another one in
which the dependency expresses that each agent receives utility from his connections.
In both cases, the Nash equilibria are characterized.
Our paper is also linked with the growing literature on games played in a network, in
which players’ payoffs are intimately related to the geometry of relations among them.7  
Ballester et al. (2006) has already been cited in the Introduction. Galeotti and Goyal
(2010) model both the network formation process and the play of a game that depends
on the network formed. The authors study a game in which payoffs depend on the
(costly) information they acquire and gather from their neighbors in a network of re-
lations. The analysis of this game in a fixed network is performed in Bramoullé and
Kranton (2007), in which a set of varied possible equilibria are presented. The novelty in
Goyal and Galeotti is that they allow agents to choose their connections. They show that
the introduction of endogenous network structures induces a simpler core–periphery
structure in the equilibrium formed. In particular, equilibrium networks show a core–
periphery pattern in which a set of few individuals are highly connected with a high
number of poorly connected agents. While their setup is different from ours, we share
Goyal and Galeotti’s goal of studying a two-stage game, in which the first stage involves
investment in links (in our case, communication precision) and the second stage in-
volves play on the basis of those links. Cabrales et al. (2011) study a network game where
network formation and productive efforts are selected simultaneously, and show that
there exist two stable interior Pareto-rankable equilibria. The setup we study could have
another pure-strategy equilibrium characterized by a coordination failure, but we can
rule it out by assuming that an infinitesimal amount of information transmission occurs
even if agents do not invest in communication at all (see the discussion of uniqueness
after Theorem 1).
2. Model
Consider a set of n agents. Agent i faces a local state of the world
θi ∼N (01/si)
where si denotes the precision of θi, i.e., si = 1/Var(θi). The local states of different
agents are mutually independent. Agent i observes only θi.
7We analyze an incomplete information game played in a network. However, as usual in the literature,
we assume full knowledge by all players on the realized network structure. For some facts about network
games with incomplete information on the network structure, we refer the interested reader to Galeotti
et al. (2010).
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All agents engage in pairwise communication activity.8 Agent i receives message yij
from agent j, such that
yij = θj + εij +ηij
where εij and ηij are two normally distributed noise terms
εij ∼ N (01/rij)
ηij ∼ N (01/pij)
and rij (resp. pij) is the precision of εij (resp. ηij). We interpret εij as the noise associated
with active communication (preparing a presentation, writing a report, hosting a visit,
hosting a liaison officer) and interpret ηij as the noise associated with passive communi-
cation (listening to a presentation, reading a report, visiting a plant, appointing a liaison
officer). All the noise terms are stochastically independent from each other and from
the local states.
Agent i chooses how much to invest in speaking with and listening to other players.
Namely, he selects among the following choices.
• The precision of the active communication part of all the signals he sends, (rji)j =i,
for which he incurs cost k2r
∑
j =i rji, where kr ≥ 0 is a parameter.
• The precision of the passive communication part of all the signals he receives,
(pij)j =i, for which he incurs cost k2p
∑
j =i pij , where kp ≥ 0 is a parameter (p is
mnemonic for passive).
Thus, communication technology and communication costs are separable, both be-
tween active and passive communication and across agents. The absence of mechanical
complementarities will allow us to highlight the presence of strategic complementaries,
both between active and passive communication and across agents, which we will ex-
plore in detail in Section 4.9
We also assume that each precision term is bounded below by a very small number
ξ: rji ≥ ξ, pij ≥ ξ.10 This avoids dominated equilibria where i does not speak to j because
he does not expect j to listen and vice versa.11
After observing the local state θi and the vector of signals (yij)j =i, agent i chooses an
action ai ∈ (−∞∞).
8Here we assume that agents can, in principle, communicate with all other agents. The analysis can
be extended to situations where there are exogenous barriers to communication between certain pairs of
agents. See Section S3 of the supplementary material for an example.
9To keep notation simpler, we assume that the cost parameters, kp and kr , are the same for all agents
and all pairs. A straightforward extension is to let the cost parameters depend on the identity of the agent
incurring the cost or even on the identity of both sender and receiver. Theorem 1 would hold with small
modifications.
10We hold ξ fixed and take all other parameters to be such that nonzero equilibria satisfying these con-
straints exist.
11A natural question is whether, in this model, speaking and listening are strategic complements. The
answer to this question is not straightforward at this stage and we postpone it to the discussion that follows
the main result, Theorem 1.
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This setup contains two implicit assumptions. The first one, which was already dis-
cussed in the Introduction, is that when engaging in active communication, the agents
cannot manipulate the average of the signals they send (the report may be more or less
clear, but it cannot contain lies; the liaison officer cannot be bribed). The second as-
sumption is that agents do not observe the communication intensities chosen by other
agents directly (i.e., the agent does not see how much effort the others put into writ-
ing their reports or into reading his reports; the opportunity cost of sending/hosting
a particular liaison officer is unobservable). If precisions were observable, each agent
would have at his disposal a vector of noiseless continuous signals, which he could use
to communicate his state perfectly.
The payoff of agent i is quadratic,
ui = −
(
dii(ai − θi)2 +
∑
j =i
dij(ai − aj)2 + k2r
∑
j =i
rji + k2p
∑
j =i
pij
)
 (1)
where the term dii measures the adaptation motive, i.e., the importance of tailoring i’s
action to the local state, and the term dij represents the coordination motive, namely the
interaction between the action taken by agent i and the action taken by agent j. For the
rest of the paper, we assume that the interaction terms are positive (dij ≥ 0 for all i and
all j).12
For now, we study a game where agents invest in communication before observing
their local state. Namely, the time line comprises the following steps.
1. Agents simultaneously select their active and passive communication intensity
vectors (rji)j =i and (pij)j =i.
2. Agents observe their local state of the world θi.
3. Agents receive signals from other agents (yij)j =i.
4. Agents select their actions ai.
We refer to this game as (Dk s), where D = (dij)ij , k = (krkp), and s = (si)i.
One can think of a different timing in which agents invest in communication af-
ter observing their local state, in which case stages 1 and 2 in the time line above are
inverted. The timing choice depends on whether one thinks of communication invest-
ment as long term or short term. Under this alternative timing, the investment in active
and passive communication may depend on agents’ local states. For the rest, the game
is identical and we denote it with θ(Dk s). The notation is mnemonic for the fact that
communication intensities are chosen after the θ is observed. In the next section, we
will discuss an equivalence result between these two versions of the game.
The two main assumptions of our model—quadratic payoffs and normal distribu-
tion of signals—are standard in the organizational economics literature inspired by team
theory (Marschak and Radner 1972).13 They are usually justified as limiting results.
12In our notation, whenever a variable has two agent indices, such as yij or dij , the first index denotes the
agent who is “directly affected,” such as the receiver of a signal or the owner of the payoff.
13See Garicano and Prat (2013) for a survey.
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Quadratic payoffs can be thought of as second-order local approximations of any dif-
ferentiable utility function.14 In our case, the normal distribution of signals can be seen,
with the use of the central limit theorem, as the limiting distribution in a scenario where
information comes from many small and independent binary pieces of information that
are transmitted satisfactorily, or otherwise are meaningless, with some probability and
where the receiver averages all the pieces he receives from a sender.
3. Communication and decisions in equilibrium
In this section, we study how agents invest in communication and make decisions in
equilibrium. Before stating the formal result, it is useful to provide an informal discus-
sion of the equilibrium structure. As mentioned in the Introduction, this game has a
complex array of interaction effects.
The game is solved by backward induction. In the second stage, agents know their
own communication intensities and have a conjecture about other agents’ intensities.
On the basis of this, they use the signals they receive to choose their actions. Given the
linear-quadratic structure of the game, the optimal action for agent i is given by
Dia
∗
i (yi)= diiθi +
∑
j =i
dijE[a∗j |yi] (2)
In what follows, we denote the sum of his interaction parameters for agent i with
Di =
n∑
j=1
dij
and denote the normalized interaction parameter between i and j as
ωij = dij
Di

The first-order condition (2) is thus
a∗i (yi)=ωiiθi +
∑
j =i
ωijE[a∗j |yi] (3)
which contains a directly observable term (θi) and a first-order expectation (the other
agents’ actions).
Combining the first-order conditions of the form (3) generates iterated expectations.
For instance, one additional round yields
a∗i (yi)=ωiiθi +
∑
j =i
ωijE
[
ωjjθj +
∑
k=j
ωjkE[a∗k|yj]
∣∣∣yi]
14While we focus in the paper on a specific form of quadratic games, with a particular adaptation–
coordination structure, our results can easily be extended to any quadratic utility function where, as below
in text, the cross-effects in individual actions would determine the interaction matrix we use.
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which contains a directly observable term (θi), a first-order expectation on the other
agents’ local states, and a second-order expectation (the other agents’ actions). The
good news is that expectations on other agents’ local states can be represented in a linear
form, for any order. For instance, the first-order expectation term of i on j’s state is
i→ j: ωijE[ωjjθj|yi] = ωijωjj︸ ︷︷ ︸
second-order coord. concern
× pijrij
pijsj + rijsj +pijrij︸ ︷︷ ︸
information extraction
× yij
The information extraction ratio is the classical formula for the expected value of an
unobserved normally distributed variable (the local state θj in this case) given an ob-
served normally distributed signal (the signal from j to i, i.e., yij). In variance terms, it
corresponds to
1
sj
1
sj
+ 1pij + 1rij

The ratio is decreasing in the precision of the local state, sj , and increasing in the pre-
cision of the signal, the sum of the speaking investment rij , and the listening invest-
ment pij .
In the next round, the second-order expectation term of i on k’s state, mediated by
j’s signal, is
i→ j → k: ωijωjkE
[
E[ωkkθk|yj]
∣∣yi]
= ωijωjkωkk︸ ︷︷ ︸
third order coord. concern
× pijrij
pijsj + rijsj +pijrij
pjkrjk
pjksk + rjksk +pjkrjk︸ ︷︷ ︸
information extraction about k
× yik
and so on.
In the proof of Theorem 1, we show that expectations converge and we can always
find an equilibrium of the form
a∗i (yi)= biiθi +
∑
j =i
bijyij (4)
Furthermore the b coefficients are unique, and they can be characterized in a relatively
simple way as a function of the communication intensities that are chosen in the first
stage, the p’s and the r’s.
With these conditions in mind, we can now move to the first stage of the game, where
agents make communication investments. Recall that agent i’s loss, net of communica-
tion costs, is given by
dii(ai − θi)2 +
∑
j =i
dij(ai − aj)2 (5)
If communication is poor, agent i suffers in two ways: his own action ai contains an
additional noise and the other agents’ actions, the aj ’s, contain additional noise. By (4),
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we can write
Var(a∗i )= b2ii Var(θi)+
∑
j =i
b2ij Var(yij)
which, combined with (5), implies that investment in passive communication pij yields
expected marginal benefit Dib2ij and investment in active communication rji yields
dijb
2
ji. Given our assumptions on communication costs, equilibrium communication
intensities must be given by
pij =
√
Dibij
kp
and rji =
√
dijbji
kr
 (6)
Now, as shown in the proof, we can close the analysis by plugging equilibrium inten-
sities in the second-stage decision coefficient b. To provide a complete characterization,
we introduce one last piece of notation: for any pair of individuals i and j, we define
hij =
{
ωjj if i= j
−sj( kp√Di +
kr√
dji
) otherwise.
Also, define  as a square matrix with (i j) entry equal to ωij and 0 on the diagonal.
We can show (see the Appendix for a complete proof) the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any (D s), if kr and kp are sufficiently low, the game (Dk s) has an
equilibriumwhere the following statements hold:
(i) Decisions are given by
b·j = (I−)−1 · h·j for all j
(ii) Active communication is
rij =
√
djibij
kr
for all i = j
(iii) Passive communication is
pij =
√
Dibij
kp
for all i = j
The theorem offers a simple equilibrium characterization. Conditions (ii) and (iii)
correspond to (6), and express each communication intensity as a linear function of just
one decision coefficient. It requires that kr and kp are sufficiently low. If this condition
fails, the lower-bound constraint on communication intensities may be violated. In that
case, the equilibrium involves corner solutions, whereby some or all of the p’s and r’s
are equal to the minimal value ξ. This possibility is explored in Section S5 of the sup-
plementary material. However, for any (D s), there always exist values of kp and kr that
are sufficiently low to guarantee an interior solution.
Condition (i) is based on a characterization of b that is particularly tractable because
(a) it does not depend on communication intensities (it only depends on primitives),
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(b) it can be split into n systems of equations, one for each agent, (c) it is linear, and (d) it
uses a coefficient matrix that is the same for all n agents.
While system (i) does not contain r and p, one should not think that it captures only
decision considerations. As the presence of communication parameters kr and kp indi-
cates, (i) also embodies communication considerations. Specifically, each subsystem in
condition (i) determines all the coefficients (bij)i=1n in the linear decision function of
agent i; each coefficient determined the effect of information originating from a certain
agent j, namely, the signal yij if i = j and the local state θj if i= j.
The matrix (I−)−1 admits a simple interpretation. Since  is a contraction (given
its definition and the assumption that dii > 0 for all i’s), we can write
(I−)−1 = I++2 +3 + · · · =
∑
l≥0
l
The entry ωij of 
l is the sum of all products of normalized coordination concerns of
all possible chains comprising exactly l connected agents that start with agent i and
finish with agent j. Hence, the entry ϑij of (I − )−1 is based on all product chains
from i to j, comprising any number of agents. The ϑ terms are always positive, and
they measure the strength of direct and indirect coordination concerns between two
agents. The matrix (I −)−1 is the same for all subsystems because the propagation of
interaction effects across agents goes through the same payoff matrix: a change in any
part of j’s decision function affects i through coefficient dij .
With this notation, the theorem says that the influence of agent j over agent i is de-
termined as
bij =
n∑
m=1
ϑimhmj =ϑijωjj − sj
∑
m=j
ϑim
(
kp√
Dm
+ kr√
djm
)

The influence coefficient bij has a positive term and n− 1 negative terms. The positive
term is larger when ωjj = djj/Dj is large, namely, when the sending agent’s adaptation
concerns are large compared to his coordination concerns. That shows a natural effect:
if j’s adaptation concern is strong, his action is going to be close to his local, private
information; knowing this, agent i reacts by increasing his weight in the message he
receives from j, and this reaction is stronger the more he cares to coordinate (directly or
because other individuals he cares about want to coordinate with j) with j, as captured
by ϑij .
Each negative term of the form ϑimhmj dampens the influence of j over i and re-
lates to three factors: the predictability of j’s environment (sj), i’s desire to coordinate
with m (ϑim), and the cost of communication relative to the desire for coordination
(kp/
√
Dm + kr/
√
djm), which will be discussed at length in the next section.
Regarding (ii) and (iii), there is an asymmetry between the two expressions: invest-
ment in active communication depends on one interaction parameter (dji) while in-
vestment in passive communication depends on the sum of all parameters (Di). This
asymmetry reflects a difference in the individual benefit of learning from others and the
individual benefit of informing others. This strategic asymmetry between listening and
speaking will be discussed at length in Section 4.2.
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When communication cost vanishes (kp → 0, kr → 0), the theorem predicts that all
communication precisions grow unboundedly. The vector of actions tends to a simple
limit:
a∗ = (I−)−1
⎛
⎝ω11θ1
ωnnθn
⎞
⎠ 
The robustness of the result can be probed in a number of directions. First, we can
ask what happens if, instead of assuming that communication investments are made be-
fore learning the local states, we assume the opposite. Recall that we defined θ(Dk s)
as a game that is identical to (Dk s) except that the order of the first two stages is re-
versed. In θ, agents invest after they observe their θ. In general, we would expect the set
of equilibria to be different because the incentive of agents to invest in active and passive
communication may depend on the value of their local states. This, in turn, could create
a signaling issue. However, we can prove that game θ(Dk s) has a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium that corresponds to the pure-strategy equilibrium of (Dk s). The intu-
ition for this result has to do with the assumption that payoff functions are quadratic.
The choice of ai does, of course, depend on the value of θi. However, the marginal ben-
efit of additional information is the same whether the agent knows the actual value of
his local state, as in θ, or only its expected value, as in . Strange signaling outcomes
are also prevented by use of a probability distribution with a full support. This result is
stated and proven in Section S1 of the supplementary material.
Second, is the equilibrium in Theorem 1 unique? First, the assumption that com-
munication intensities are bounded below by ξ rather than zero prevents the existence
of equilibria based on pure miscoordination. Second, there could be nonlinear equi-
libria. In the equilibrium that we describe, the actions of agents are linear functions of
the signals they receive. Within this class, it is immediate to see that our equilibrium is
unique. This is a common assumption in the literature that uses the normal-quadratic
approach, but while there are no known counterexamples, it is not obvious to show that
only linear equilibria are possible (e.g., Angeletos and Pavan 2009, Dewan and Myatt
2008). While we cannot prove uniqueness in our game, we can prove uniqueness in a
sequence of games whose limit is the game under consideration. In Section S2 of the
supplementary material, we consider a truncated version of our game, where agents’
action are bounded below and above. We show that this game has a unique equilibrium
and that such equilibrium tends to ours as the bound goes to infinity.
Third, one may also think that in reality, communication can only occur between
certain nodes. Namely, information transmission is impossible on certain edges of the
graphs. Our equilibrium characterization can be modified to accommodate this addi-
tional constraint (Section S3 of the supplementary material).
Also note that a characterization similar to Theorem 1 obtains even under different
assumptions on the structure of communication costs. For instance, rather than having
pairwise communication, we could imagine that the agents “broadcast” their signals.
Thus, each agent sustains the cost of active communication only once. This possibility
is explored in Section S4 of the supplementary material.
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4. Complementarities in communication and influence
As shown in the equilibrium characterization result, there are strategic complementari-
ties between active communication, passive communication, and decision-making that
arise in models with three or more agents. This section builds on Theorem 1 to explore
two aspects of these complementarities. It first studies indirect effects of the interaction
parameters on communication and decisions, namely what happens to bij , rij , and pij
when dij stays constant but other interaction parameters change. As we shall see, there
are subtle nonmonotonic effects. The second part of the section focuses on inefficien-
cies arising from the complementarity between communication and decision-making.
In particular, we will see that when there are three or more agents, underinvestment
in active communication is particularly acute, and we will argue that in real organi-
zations, this form of inefficiency is reduced by management practices that encourage
active communication.
4.1 Indirect effects
It is easy to check that if there are only two players, comparative statics is relatively
straightforward: an increase in the strength of the interaction parameters d12 and d21
leads to more investment in communication between the agents. This confirms pre-
vious results based on the presence of two agents only (Dewatripont and Tirole 2005,
Dessein and Santos 2006).
However, as we mentioned earlier, how Alice influences Bob does not only depend
on the direct interaction between Alice and Bob, but potentially on all other interactions.
The analysis of indirect effects is less straightforward.
The following example, which provides a link to the sociology of labor, is the simplest
way to illustrate the kind of nonmonotonic effects that can arise. Consider three agents
with the interaction matrix
D=
⎡
⎢⎣
d q 1q
q d 1q
1 1 d
⎤
⎥⎦ with q≥ 1
When q = 1, the three agents are symmetric. As q increases, a “clique” (to borrow a
term used by labor sociologists (Dalton 1959)) forms between the first two agents with
the exclusion of the third, the “outsider.”
What happens when the exogenous link between agents 1 and 2 becomes stronger?
As agents 1 and 2 care less about the outsider, there is a reduction in both communica-
tion by and influence of the outsider. The effect on communication and influence in the
other direction is instead nonmonotonic. First, there is a clique insularity effect : agents
1 and 2 care less about the outsider and, hence, they invest less in talking to him: active
communication variables r13 and r23 decrease (Figure 1(a)). Second, the outsider is af-
fected by the clique reinforcement effect. As agents 1 and 2 communicate and coordinate
more with each other, their mutual influence increases. The outsider realizes that agent
1’s and agent 2’s local states affect each other’s actions and he becomes even more eager
to learn them. He invests more in passive communication, at least for low values of q
(Figure 1(b)). When q is sufficiently high, the insularity effect must dominate. As agents
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1. (a) Active communication by agents 1 and 2 (r13/r23). (b) Passive communication by
agent 3 (p13/p23). (c) Influence of agents 1 and 2 on agent 3 (b13/b23).
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1 and 2 talk less and less to the outsider, the outsider begins to invest less in listening.
Therefore, the overall pattern of influence is monotonic (Figure 1(c)).15
It is also interesting to note that the ratio between active and passive communication
is decreasing in q throughout, confirming that the presence of a stronger exogenous tie
between agents 1 and 2 causes an increasing imbalance between the desire of outsiders
to obtain information and the willingness of agents 1 and 2 to provide it.16
4.2 Underinvestment
The presence of complementarities among agents is likely to lead to inefficiently low
investment in communication. To verify this claim, we must first define the “efficient”
benchmark, and there are two candidates. One can compare the equilibrium outcome
to the outcome that would arise if communication intensities were chosen by a planner,
while decision functions were still delegated to agents. Alternatively, one can use as a
benchmark the case where the planner is also responsible for choosing decision func-
tions. Here, we analyze the first case, as we are particularly interested in inefficiencies
that derive from underinvestment in communication.
Reconsider our baseline game (Dk s). Keep the same payoff functions ui defined
in (1), but now assume that each agent i solves
max
{b∗ij}nj=1
E[ui]
while a planner solves
max
{p∗ij}ij {r∗ij}ij
n∑
i=1
E[ui]
The planner moves first, but—as in the rest of the paper—we assume that agents do not
observe communication investments directly.17 Call this new game ∗(Dk s).
We can offer an equilibrium characterization that mirrors that of Theorem 1.
Proposition 2. If the planner chooses communication intensities, in equilibrium,
b∗·j = (I−)−1 · h∗·j for all j
r∗ij =
√√√√ n∑
k=1
dik +
n∑
k=i
dki
b∗ij
kr
for all i = j
p∗ij =
√√√√ n∑
k=1
dik +
n∑
k=i
dki
b∗ij
kp
for all i = j
15The plot uses the parameters d = 5, s1 = s2 = s3, and kp = kr = 001.
16Cliques can damage the agents who are excluded from them. Section S3 of the supplementary material
presents a three-agent example where a player is better off if communication between the other two players
is prohibited.
17In another conceivable version of the planner’s problem, communication investments could be pub-
licly observable. This will generate an additional discrepancy between the baseline game and the planner’s
problem.
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with
h∗ij =
⎧⎨
⎩
ωjj if i= j
−sj kp+kr√
Di+
∑n
k=j dkj
otherwise.
Communication creates positive externalities that players do not internalize in the
noncooperative game. Comparing Proposition 2 with Theorem 1, we see that there are
two channels that generate inefficiency. First, for any given vector of decision coeffi-
cients b, communication intensity vectors rˆ and pˆ are larger in the planner’s solution,
namely, for any given pattern of influence, agents underinvest in communication. Sec-
ond, when i = j the h∗ji are smaller in the planner’s solution, meaning that there is an
additional feedback effect that goes through influence. In the planner’s solution, agents
expect communication intensities to be higher and, hence, they are more influenced by
signals they receive. As both effects go in the same directions, this proves the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium of ∗(Dk s), all the decision coefficients and com-
munication intensities are larger than in the equilibrium of (Dk s).
Now that we know that communication investment is too low, we can ask whether
underinvestment is more of a problem for active or for passsive communication.
Namely, for any directed link between two agents, is the ratio rij/pij higher in the base-
line case or when the planner chooses communication intensities? From Proposition 2
and Theorem 1, we see the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In the planner’s solution the active/passive ratio depends only on rela-
tive cost
rij
pij
= kp
kr

Instead, in the noncooperative solution, the ratio is
rij
pij
= kp
kr
√
dji
Di

In general, we should expect Di > dji.18 For instance, if the problem is symmetric
(dij = d¯Q for all i = j and dii = (1− (n− 1)d¯)Q), we have
γij = d¯ for all i = j
Consider the case in which active and passive communication are equally costly, i.e.,
kp = kr . As d¯ < 1/(n− 1), this means that the ratio between active and passive commu-
nication is bounded above by 1/(n−1), implying that (i) it is smaller than 1 and (ii) it be-
comes lower as n increases. The only case where passive communication does not have
18Only in the case that agent i is particularly prominent and the interaction coefficient dji for another
agent j is larger than the sum of interaction coefficients Di that affect agent i, active communication can
be relatively more intensive than passive communication.
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an intrinsic advantage is when there are only two agents. Conversely, as the number of
agents increases, the ratio tends to zero.
As we mentioned after Theorem 1, between active and passive communication,
there is strategic asymmetry, which favors passive communication. We will now offer
a more precise intuition for this result. Consider two agents, i and j, and focus on com-
munication from j to i, both i listening (pij) and j speaking (rij). The payoffs of the two
agents, net of communication costs, are given by
ui = −dii(ai − θi)2 −
∑
k=i
dik(ai − ak)2
uj = −djj(aj − θj)2 −
∑
k=j
djk(aj − ak)2
The signal that i receives from j, yij , affects i’s action. As our equilibrium is linear,
daij
dyij
= bij
An increase in the precision of the signal yij increases the precision of the action aij ,
which, in turn, is beneficial to our risk-averse agents because it eliminates unnecessary
noise in the decision. However, the expressions for ui and uj show that this effect is
asymmetric. For the receiver i, the effect is quite direct as it involves his action ai directly
and it affects all the terms of his payoff:
duj
dyij
=Dibij
Instead, for the sender j, the effect is less direct as it does not involve his action aj directly
but just the receiver’s action:
dui
dyij
= djibij
The asymmetry captures the idea that passive communication has a more immediate
use than active communication because the receiver can control the action directly,
while the sender must reply on the receiver’s decision.
Our results imply that organizations—and, in particular, firms—should look for di-
rect and indirect ways to incentivize communication and, in particular, active commu-
nication. Indeed, companies often boast about their culture of internal communication.
Many management methods introduce protocols that require workers to set aside time
to communicating with other agents. A case in point is quality function deployment
(QFD), a quality management method that originated in Japan and is now widely used
across the world (Akao 1990). There is direct evidence that QFD operates by increas-
ing communication intensity beyond hierarchical lines (Griffin and Hauser 1992). An-
other example of a structured way to encourage communication is provided by the use
of “quality circles” in total quality management (TQM).
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It is interesting to note that management methods such as the above-cited QFD
place a great emphasis on giving a voice to all team members, encouraging them to com-
municate their information independent of their hierarchical position. In our setup, this
can be seen as an attempt to reduce the cost of active communication, which we have
just seen would be particularly useful to the company, especially if it is large.
Ichniowski et al.’s (1997) influential study of the effect of the adoption of human
resources management (HRM) practices finds a positive effect of setting up meetings
between managers and workers. Ichniowski and Shaw (2004) consider, in particular,
the role of communication and shows that the successful adoption of innovative (and
performance-enhancing) HRM practices requires investing in workers’ connective cap-
ital. The latter, however, comes at a cost: “these investments in connective capital can be
costly—involving higher training, screening, and information sharing costs, and poten-
tially higher wages.” Thus it appears that moving toward the planner’s solution requires
the organization to invest in a set of tools and practices that encourage employees to
communicate.
The result that underinvestment in active communication is more severe than un-
derinvestment in passive communication depends on our assumption that communi-
cation has a pairwise nature. In our setup, there are no economies of scale in sending
signals to multiple agents or receiving signals from multiple agents. Phone calls and site
visits are good examples of pairwise costs. However, other communication modes dis-
play economies of scale on the active side. The cost of sending an e-mail or updating a
website is almost independent from the number of recipients or readers. However, such
economies of scale are mostly absent on the passive side. As one expects, this would
readjust the balance between active and passive communication.19 This observation
does not invalidate the result that there is a tendency to underinvest in active commu-
nication; it just implies that the tendency can be offset by strong economies of scale in
active communication.
5. How influential is an agent?
In this section, we use the characterization in Theorem 1 to measure the overall influ-
ence of agents on their peers. Influence has so far only been discussed in bilateral terms:
how much does agent i influence agent j? We now ask how influential an agent is with
respect to all other agents. The global influence of agent i will capture the marginal ef-
fect of a change in i’s local state on the other agents. The assumption that local states
are independent guarantees that influence is purely due to communication and coor-
dination, and not to spurious correlation between actions due to correlation between
states.
The global influence of agent i, which we denote by Ii, is
Ii =
n∑
j=1
bji k= 1     n
19In Section S4 of the supplementary material, we modify the baseline model to allow for economies of
scale on the active communication side, and we show that the ratio between active and passive communi-
cation is approximately 1.
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In words, the global influence of agent i corresponds to the sum of the expected
effects of a change on the agent’s local state on all actions (including the agent’s own
action). The average action of the group conditional on the values of 
θ = (θ1     θn) is
equal to20
E
θ
[
1
n
∑
i
n∑
j=1
bjiyji
]
= 1
n
∑
i
n∑
j=1
bjiθi = 1
n
∑
i
Iiθi
Our notion of influence is an equilibrium concept. It depends on the communi-
cation investment and decision strategy that the players in our game choose. In this
section, we will first show that our game-theoretic notion is linked to a widespread ax-
iomatic measure of centrality: eigenvector centrality. We then illustrate, through an ex-
ample inspired by Dalton (1959), how this correspondence can be used to understand
and measure organizational phenomena.
5.1 Eigenvector centrality
As mentioned in the Introduction, eigenvector centrality displays properties that are
unique among centrality measures (Palacios-Huerta and Volij 2004), and has been ap-
plied successfully in search engines and citation indices. To the best of our knowledge,
there exists no game-theoretic microfoundation of eigenvector centrality.
Let us now provide a formal definition (in the remarks to Theorem 5, we will dis-
cuss how eigenvector centrality relates to other centrality measures). Given a network
described by an n-square adjacency matrix G, let G˜ be the normalized version of the
matrix, where all the gii’s are set to zero and every element g˜ij is defined as
g˜ij = gij∑
k=i gik

The eigenvector centrality index is defined as the positive left eigenvector of matrix
G˜, namely the smallest strictly positive vector ι that solves
ι= G˜′ι (7)
Since G˜ is by definition a stochastic matrix, its largest eigenvalue is equal to 1; therefore,
1 is also the largest eigenvalue of G˜′. Furthermore, the matrix is irreducible as all en-
tries are strictly positive. The Perron–Frobenius theorem ensures then that there exists
a unique nonnegative eigenvector of G˜′ associated to this eigenvalue. The eigenvector
centrality vector is just a normalization of this vector. Note that the vector can always be
normalized so that its elements sum to 1. From now on, we always use this normaliza-
tion.
One way to understand this definition is to see G˜ as a Markov transition matrix and
see ι as its ergodic state. Imagine an object that bounces probabilistically from one node
to the other according to G˜: the value of ιi denotes the percentage of time that the object
spends, on average, in node i.
20We define yii = θi for all i.
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Another way to understand eigenvector centrality is to think of the importance of
node i as defined by a weighted sum of the other nodes’ “importances,” where the
weights are given by the g’s, namely
ιi =
∑
j =i
g˜jiιj
In other words, node i “receives” a percentage g˜ji of the importance of node j. If we
repeat this exercise for all nodes, we obtain the system (7). Thus, the vector ι is the fixed
point of this importance-distribution procedure.
To connect eigenvector centrality to our game, fix D, s, kr , and kp, and define the
payoff function
ui = −
(
dii(ai − θi)2 + 1
t
∑
j =i
dij(ai − aj)2 + tλk2r
∑
j =i
rji + tλk2p
∑
j =i
pij
)

where t ∈ (0∞) and λ > 1.
For every value of the parameter t, we have a well defined instance of our game,
which, with a slight abuse of notation, we can call (D skrkp t). A decrease in t has
two effects: it reduces the relative importance of adaptation over coordination and it
reduces the cost of communication (even faster as λ is larger than 1).
For every (D skrkp), we have the following definitions:
• Global influence. For every t > 0, Theorem 1 provides a unique characterization
of the equilibrium in communication and decisions, which, in turn, results in a
unique vector of global influences. We let Ii(t) denote the global influence of
agent i when the parameter has value t.
• Eigenvector centrality. Let G˜ be the matrix with entries γii = 0 for all i and let
γij = dij/∑k=i dik. Based on the discussion above, the eigenvector index of agent
i is ιi, defined as the ith component of the vector that solves
ι= G˜′ι
and that satisfies
∑
j ιj = 1. Note that this definition only makes use of the inter-
action matrix D, not of s, kr , and kp.
The two notions are related by the following theorem.
Theorem 5. As t → 0, the relative global influence of agents converges to the ratio
of eigenvector centrality indices weighted by an adaptation of v’s coordination ratio.
Namely, for any i and j,
lim
t→0
Ii(t)
Ij(t)
= ιi
ιj
dii
D−i
djj
D−j

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In particular, if dii = djj andD−i =D−j for all i j ∈N , then we obtain that
lim
t→0
Ii(t)
Ij(t)
= ιi
ιj

Theorem 5 builds on two intermediate results. First, we show (Step 1 of the proof;
see the Appendix) that the global influence of an agent Ii(t) can be written as a weighted
sum of the Bonacich centrality indices of all the agents, where the weight on agent i is
positive and the weights on all the other agents are negative. Bonacich centrality is based
on counting the number of paths (with appropriate weights) that reach a certain node.21
In our case, the weight of a path is the product of all the dij of the links that form the path.
A node is more central if the weighted sum of paths is larger. This first step is inspired
by Ballester et al.’s (2006) result on network games with linear-quadratic utilities, but
extends the framework to asymmetric information and endogenous communication.
Furthermore, we show that when communication costs go down, all the negative terms
in the weighted sum of the Bonacich centrality indices vanish and Ii(t) tends to the
Bonacich centrality of agent i. This is intuitive because when communication becomes
costless, our model converges to Ballester et al.’s (2006) complete information setup.
Second, we show that when the relative importance of the adaptation terms dii goes
to zero, the ratio between the Bonacich centralities of two agents tends to the ratio of
the eigenvector centralities of those two agents (multiplied by (diiD−j)/(D−idjj)). The
underlying idea is that the difference between Bonacich centrality and eigenvector cen-
trality is that the former puts some exogenous baseline centrality on each agent. In our
case, it is proportional to their adaptation coefficient dii. As we let the relative impor-
tance of adaptation go to zero, Bonacich centrality tends to eigenvector centrality. This
intermediate result is closely related to Bonacich (1987), who establishes an asymptotic
connection between Bonacich centrality and eigenvector centrality. Bonacich’s result is
extended by Golub and Lever (2010, Theorem 3), who provide general conditions under
which Bonacich centrality converges to eigenvector centrality.
Note that the precision of agent i’s state, si, does not appear in Theorem 5. This is
because Ii measures a marginal effect. Of course, the average influence of an agent on
other agents will be greater if the precision si is lower.
Remark 6. When t = 0, Ii(t) is not well defined. When t = 0, Theorem 1 does not apply
for two reasons. First, if all adaptation terms dii are zero, the matrix (I −) is singular
and b’s are not well defined, which captures the fact that agents who care only about
coordination can achieve their goals by agreeing to select all the same arbitrary action
independent of the realization of local states. Second, if kr and kp are zero, the expres-
sions in (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 1 are not well defined, because the agents would choose
infinite precisions.
21See Jackson (2008, Chapter 2) for a discussion of Bonacich centrality and eigenvector centrality, and
for more bibliographical references. Confusingly, Bonacich worked on both measures and his name is as-
sociated with both. We follow the convention, adopted by most economists, of calling Bonacich centrality
the measure used by Ballester et al. (2006).
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Figure 2. Global influence.
Theorem 5 can be understood as an approximation result. When agents are much
more interested in coordinating with other agents than adapting to their own state, rel-
ative influence can be approximated by a weighted version of the eigenvector centrality
index. To illustrate this point, consider the following numerical example. Suppose that
s1 = s2 = s3 = s4 and that the interaction matrix is given by
D =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
q 1 2 4
1 q 2 4
1 2 q 4
1 2 4 q
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ 
As this example satisfies the condition that dii and D−i are constant across agents, we
can use the simplified version of Theorem 1. Also suppose that kr = kp = 0001q2.
For every positive value of q, one can use Theorem 1 to compute the communication-
based global influence of each agent. The relative influence is depicted in Figure 2 as
Ii/(I1 + I2 + I3 + I4).
The eigenvector centrality indices can be easily computed from D:
ι1 = 0125 ι2 = 0208 ι3 = 0303 ι4 = 0363
Figure 2 compares the eigenvector indices and the global influences for positive val-
ues of q. As Theorem 5 predicts, when q tends to zero, the relative global influences tend
to the eigenvector indices. One can also see that the eigenvector centrality index is a
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good approximation even for relatively large values of q; in fact, values that are larger
than any of the other interaction parameters, like q > 1.22
5.2 Influence in hierarchical structure
Because of its extreme tractability, the eigenvector centrality allows us to obtain simple
predictions on which agents will be more influential. Instead of trying to characterize
the comparative statics of the whole game, we can focus our attention on the eigenvec-
tor centrality indices, which are computed on coordination parameters (dij)i =j only. Of
course, as proven in Theorem 5, these predictions are only approximately correct and
the validity of the approximation depends on how strong the coordination motive is
vis-á-vis the adaptation motive.
The range of applications is virtually boundless. One natural question, which we
can use to illustrate the scope of the theorem, has to do with influence in hierarchies.
According to Weber (1978), efficient bureaucracies take the form of hierarchies where in-
fluence emanates necessarily from the top. Dalton (1959) famously showed that the We-
berian view was at odds with extensive evidence from a U.S. chemical plant. Top man-
agers appeared to be less influential than middle managers. The latter formed cliques
with workers and exerted the actual control on production: these arrangements were of-
ten motivated by personal goals, but they also helped make the firm run smoothly. While
these issues are complex and deserve a more systematic treatment, our setup yields a
simple benchmark result on when we should expect middle managers to be more influ-
ential than top managers. We first show that hierarchies exhibit an intrinsic bias toward
making top agents in higher tiers more influential. We then give an example of what has
to happen for this bias to be overcome.
Hierarchical structures can be represented as a subclass of our games. Consider a set
of agents grouped into K levels. At level 0, there is one agent. An agent at level k has s ≥ 2
subordinates at level k − 1. Every agent reports to exactly one superior. The agents at
levelK have no subordinates. If i is a subordinate of j, then we assume that dij = 1 (a nor-
malization) and dji = a.23 We call the problem we have just defined a regular hierarchy
because it looks the same at every level, except the top and the bottom.
22It is interesting to note that other simple graph-theoretic measures would not perform as well. Take,
for instance, one of the simplest measures of the value of a node, the (relative) in-degree, namely the sum
of the strength of interactions from other agents toward a particular agent (divided by the total strength of
interaction over the graph):
IDi =
∑
j dij∑
ij dij

The result would be
ID1 = 0107; ID2 = 0178; ID3 = 0285; ID4 = 0428
which is a much worse approximation for all values of q on the range.
23For any other two agents, we assume dij = 0. For a generic game, the presence of zero interaction
coefficients could lead to binding nonnegativity constraints. However, in the asymptotic case under con-
sideration, the cost of communication becomes a negligible fraction of the coordination gains. As we show
in the proof of Theorem 5, nonnegativity constraints are not binding in the limit.
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Dalton’s nonmonotonic influence cannot occur in a regular hierarchy.24
Proposition 7. For any s ≥ 2 and any 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, the ratio between the influence of
an agent and his superior is
Ik+1
Ik
= a
In a regular hierarchy, Dalton’s anomaly cannot arise: global influence is monotonic
in the agent’s level—increasing if a > 1 and decreasing if a < 1. Given that superiors have
many subordinates, but subordinates have only one superior, the natural assumption is
that a < 1. In fact, one might assume that an agent cares as much about his superior as
the set of his subordinates: as = 1. In that case, the influence ratio is the reciprocal of
the span,
Ik+1 = 1
s
Ik
What is the intuition for this result in terms of our noncooperative communication
and influence game? In equilibrium, agents invest in communication mostly along hi-
erarchical lines. Agents will also invest in communicating laterally and skipping lev-
els (e.g., to coordinate with his superior’s action, an agent wants to know his superior’s
state). However, these investments are much lower. Hence, influence too follows hi-
erarchical lines: the local state of a superior affects her subordinates’ decisions and the
local states of inferiors affect their superior’s action. However, one superior affects many
subordinates, while one subordinate only affects one superior. This multiplier effect de-
termines monotonicity in influence.
To find a situation à la Dalton where influence is nonmonotonic, we abandon the
assumption that the hierarchy is regular. For instance, we can assume that interaction
terms are stronger at lower levels than at higher levels. Suppose that K = 3 and s = 2.
First, consider a regular hierarchy where dij = 1 and dji = 12 for all superior–subordinate
pairs. The proposition above is confirmed; the eigenvector centrality indices increase
monotonically with the agent’s rank,
I0 = I1 = 848
I2 = 448
I3 = 148 
24This ratio does not apply at the top and at the bottom. At the bottom, monotonicity holds a fortiori. At
the top, there is a potential problem because the agent at level 0 interacts with only s agents and, hence, he
is at a disadvantage. For the top two levels,
I1
I0
= a+ 1
s

The assumption that an agent cares equally about his superior and the set of his subordinates (as = 1)
guarantees monotonicity at the top.
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Now modify the hierarchy above by assuming that if i belongs to k= 3 and j belongs
to k= 2, dij = 4 and dji = 2. For this irregular hierarchy, the eigenvector centrality yields
I0 = I1 = 448
I2 = 548
I3 = 248 
Hence, now agents at tier 2 are more influential than agents in the top two tiers.
What breaks the Weberian influence monotonicity in this example is that the two
bottom levels have strong ties to each other. They invest a lot in communicating with
each other and they influence each other. These strong ties do not extend to the top two
levels and agents at the two bottom level are not very influenced by the local states of
top managers. In Dalton’s language, each level-2 manager with his two level-3 workers
constitutes a vertical symbiotic clique, i.e., a two-way tie between an officer and his sub-
ordinates that represents the “most common and enduring clique in large structures”
(Dalton 1959, p. 59).
The results in this section—both the proposition and the counterexample—are ap-
proximations that were obtained by looking only at coordination coefficients of the form
dij , with i = j. The analysis was much simpler than if we had tried to operate directly on
the equilibrium of the noncooperative game. But we also know that the approximations
are valid, at least locally. For values of the adaptation coefficients dii and the commu-
nication parameters k that are sufficiently low, Theorem 1 guarantees that the relations
that we have uncovered for eigenvector centrality indices are reflected in similar rela-
tions for global influence.
6. Conclusion
The present paper is a step toward modeling equilibrium endogenous costly informa-
tion flows among multiple agents, but much work remains to be done. Of course, it
would be interesting to know what happens beyond the normal-quadratic setup and
to show under what conditions the normal-quadratic is a good approximation of other
settings. Other communication structures are explored in the supplementary material
(broadcasting and alternative communication protocols). However, it would be inter-
esting to take a more general approach and perform comparative statics on communi-
cation modes, for instance, asking how communication and influence change when the
communication technology changes.
Does our model have the potential to be used for empirical work? What kind of data
could identify the model? Suppose that we observe the information flows among nodes
of a network (e.g., what amount of resources each firm spends for liaising with other
firms) but not the underlying interaction matrix, communication cost parameters, local
state uncertainty, or decision functions. The potential for identification is there. If the
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number of agents is at least four, Theorem 1 supplies a number of restrictions that is at
least as large as the number of primitive variables to be estimated.25
A similar identification potential exists in the other formulation of the problem,
which is explored in the Appendix. This observation, although preliminary, appears to
indicate that data on information flows could be a fruitful avenue for investigating or-
ganizations empirically if combined with a model—not necessarily the present one—of
endogenous communication in network games (Garicano and Prat 2013).
In our paper, asymmetric information flows occur as a response to asymmetric in-
teraction structures. However, Dessein et al. (2013) show that with different communi-
cation cost structures, asymmetric information flows arise in symmetric situations, thus
forming the basis for a rational inattention theory of endogenous leadership.
Finally, we have considered a static setup, and although this seems to be a natural
starting point for our inquiry, it would be interesting to analyze dynamic communica-
tion protocols in a similar environment. Information would then come from direct com-
munication and from learning of the past activity of some or all agents in the organiza-
tion. This relates to a recent literature on social learning in networks (see, for example,
Bala and Goyal 1998 and Acemoglu et al. 2011) and we plan to pursue this analysis in
future research.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
Agent i’s payoff gross of communication costs is given by
ui = −
(
dii(ai − θi)2 +
∑
j =i
dij(ai − aj)2
)

As is well known for quadratic games, the action that maximizes i’s expected payoff is
ai = diiθi +
∑
j =i
dijE[aj]
In the conjectured equilibrium, in the second stage of the game, agent i knows that he
has chosen (r˜ji)j =i and (p˜ij)j =i (which may be different from the equilibrium values). He
assumes that the other agents have chosen communication intensities according to the
equilibrium values and that they will choose actions according to the equilibrium linear
strategies. The optimal action is then
ai = diiθi +
∑
j =i
dijE
[
bjjθj +
∑
k=j
bjkyjk
]
= diiθi +
∑
j =i
dijE
[
bjjθj +
∑
k=j
bjk(θk + εjk +ηjk)
]

25Palacios-Huerta and Prat (2010) exploit e-mail traffic data within a company to compute the eigenvec-
tor centrality of individual workers, and show that it predicts the workers’ success within the company as
measured in terms of rank, income, and career path.
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The solution to this classical signal extraction problem is a linear function
ai = b˜iiθi +
∑
j =i
b˜ijyij
where coefficients are defined by
Dib˜ii = dii +
∑
j =i
dijbji (8)
Dib˜ij = rijp˜ij
sjrij + sjp˜ij + rijp˜ij
∑
k=i
dikbkj for all j = i (9)
Now consider the first stage of the game. While precisions yield more compact final
expressions, the first part of this proof is more readable if we use variances. We denote
by σi = 1/si the variance of θi, by ρij = 1/rij the variance of εij , and by πij = 1/pij the
variance of ηij (the omission of the square sign is intentional: σ , ρ, and π are variances,
not standard deviations). The payoff for agent i in (Dk s) is given by
ui = −
(
dii(ai − θi)2 +
∑
j =i
dij(ai − aj)2 +
∑
j =i
k2r
(
1
ρji
)
+
∑
j =i
k2p
(
1
πij
))

Given the strategies to be used in the second stage,
−ui = dii
(
(b˜ii − 1)θi +
∑
k=i
b˜ik(θk + εik +ηik)
)2
+
∑
j =i
dij
(∑
k
(b˜ik − bjk)θk +
∑
k=i
b˜ikεik +
∑
k=i
b˜ikηik −
∑
k=j
bjkεjk −
∑
k=j
bjkηjk
)2
+
∑
j =i
k2r
(
1
ρji
)
+
∑
j =i
k2p
(
1
πij
)

Given the assumption that noise terms are stochastically independent, the expected
payoff of i is
−E[ui] = dii
(
(b˜ii − 1)2σi +
2∑
k=i
b˜2ik(σk + ρik +πik)
)
+
∑
j =i
dij
(∑
k
(b˜ik − bjk)2σk +
∑
k=i
b˜2ik(ρik +πik)+
∑
k=j
b2jk(ρjk +πjk)
)
(10)
+ k2r
∑
j =i
1
ρji
+ k2p
∑
j =i
1
πij

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By the envelope theorem, we can disregard effects of the form (db˜ik)/(dρik). The first-
order conditions are
−∂E[ui]
∂ρji
= dijb2ji + k2r
(
1
ρji
)2
= 0 (11)
−∂E[ui]
∂πij
= Dib˜2ij + k2p
(
1
πij
)2
= 0 (12)
Now replace precisions in (11) and (12), and combine them with (8) and (9) for all
agents to obtain a system of equations that characterize the equilibrium:
Dibii = dii +
∑
j =i
dijbji for all i (13)
Dibij = rijpij
sjrij + sjpij + rijpij
∑
k=i
dikbkj for all i j = i (14)
√
djibij
kr
= rij for all i j = i (15)
√
Dibij
kp
= pij for all i j = i (16)
Restrict attention to a particular i. Plugging (15) and (16) into (14), we obtain(
sj
kp√
Di
+ sj kr√
dji
+ bij
)
Di =
∑
k=i
dikbkj for all j = i
which can be rewritten as
bij −
∑
k=i
dik
Di
bkj = −sj
(
kp√
Di
+ kr√
dji
)
for all j = i (17)
Also note that (13) can be rewritten as
bii −
∑
k=i
dik
Di
bki = dii
Di
 (18)
Using the definitions of ωij and hij , the system composed of (17) and (18) becomes
bii −
∑
k=i
ωikbki = hii
bij −
∑
k=i
ωikbkj = hij for all j = i
which in matrix notation corresponds to
(I−)b·j = h·j
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with solution
b·j = (I−)−1 · h·j
The last expression, combined with (15) and (16), constitutes the statement of the
theorem.
Proof of Proposition 2
The agents’ best responses in the second round, given communication intensities and
other agents’ strategies are the same as in the baseline case, namely (13) and (14). In-
stead, of course, the first-order condition for communication intensities given the b’s
has changed. The planner solves
− ∂
∂ρji
n∑
k=1
E[uk] =
(
n∑
k=1
dik +
n∑
k=i
dki
)
(b∗ji)
2 − kr
(
1
ρji
)2
= 0
− ∂
∂πij
n∑
k=1
E[uk] =
(
n∑
k=1
dik +
n∑
k=i
dki
)
(b∗ij)
2 − kp
(
1
πij
)2
= 0
which can be rewritten as
r∗ij =
√√√√ n∑
k=1
dik +
n∑
k=i
dki
b∗ij
kr
for all i = j
p∗ij =
√√√√ n∑
k=1
dik +
n∑
k=i
dki
b∗ij
kp
for all i = j
The values of h∗ are obtained by replacing p∗ and r∗ in (13) and (14).
Proof of Proposition 3
We have that h∗ji > hji for all j = i and that h∗ii = hii. This immediately implies that b∗ji >
bji for all i, j, and, therefore, that r∗ij > rij and p
∗
ij > pij for all i, j because
∑n
k=1 dik +∑n
k=i dki > dji and
∑n
k=1 dik +
∑n
k=i dki > Di.
Proof of Theorem 5
The proof consists of five steps.
Step 1. Bonacich centrality, developed in sociology (Bonacich 1987) and applied to
economics by Ballester et al. (2006), is defined as follows. Consider a network described
by an n-square adjacency matrix G, where gij ∈ [01] measures the strength of the path
from i to j. Define the matrix
M(G)= [I−G]−1
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Each element mij of the matrix M can be interpreted as a sum of the paths—direct or
indirect—leading from node i to node j. Let mij(G) be the ij element of M.
The Bonacich centrality measure of node i is defined as
βi(G)=
n∑
j=1
mij(G)
The centrality of node i is determined by the weighted sum of paths to all nodes that
begin in i.
Global influence and Bonacich centrality are connected by the following result.26
Lemma 8. The global influence of agent i can be expressed as a weighted sum of all the
agents’ Bonacich centrality measures, computed on ′ with decay factor 1, where the
weights are given by h·i:
Ii =
n∑
j=1
βj(
′)hji
The influence of agent i is a sum of weighted Bonacich measures, where the weight
on the agent’s own measure is positive (because hii =ωii) while all the other weights are
negative. Hence, an agent’s global influence depends positively on the centrality of that
agent and negatively on the centrality of all other agents.
Proof of Lemma 8. From Theorem 1, we know that for all i,
b·i = (I−)−1 · h·i
We can write ⎡
⎣b1i
bni
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ ((I−)
−1)11 · · · ((I−)−1)1n


((I−)−1)n1 · · · ((I−)−1)nn
⎤
⎦ ·
⎡
⎣h1i
hni
⎤
⎦
=
n∑
j=1
hji
⎡
⎢⎣
((I−)−1)1j

((I−)−1)nj
⎤
⎥⎦= n∑
j=1
hji
⎡
⎢⎣
((I−)−1)′j1

((I−)−1)′jn
⎤
⎥⎦
so that
Ii =
n∑
k=1
bki =
n∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
hji((I −)−1)′jk =
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
k=1
((I−)−1)′jk
)
hji
26If we compare Lemma 8 to Ballester et al.’s (2006) Theorem 1, there are three differences. First, their
result is based on symmetric information, while ours is based on asymmetric information and endogenous
communication. Second, their measure is a Bonacich index, while ours is a weighted sum of Bonacich
indices. Third, their decay rate varies according to the model, while ours is always 1. For all these reasons,
it is not easy to establish an intuitive connection between the two results.
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If we define the G matrix in the Bonacich measure to be the transpose of the  matrix
used in Theorem 1 and we let a= 1, we have
M(G a)= M(′1)= [I−′]−1 = ([I−]−1)′
and, hence,
n∑
k=1
((I−)−1)′jk = βj(′1)
so that
Ii =
n∑
j=1
βj(
′1)hji 
Step 2. For any given t, the matrix ˜(t) is equal to
˜(t)=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 d12
td011+
∑
j =1 d1j
· · · d1n
td011+
∑
j =2 d1j
d21
td022+
∑
j =2 d2j
0 · · · d2n
td022+
∑
j =2 d2j


  

dn1
td0nn+
∑
j =n dnj
dn2
td0nn+
∑
j =n dnj
· · · 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ 
Note that ˜(0)= G˜ (as defined in the text).
For any t > 0, the Bonacich centrality vector associated to ˜(t), which we denote
β(˜(t)), is the solution to the system
(I− ˜′(t))β(˜(t))= 1
Note that the Bonacich centrality measure is well defined if and only if the determi-
nant of (I − ˜′(t))−1 is different than 0, and in such a case, the solution to the previous
system is
β(˜(t))= (I− ˜′(t))−11
The eigenvector centrality influence vector is related to the system
(I− ˜′(0))x = 0
Let E be the set of solutions to this system. Since the largest eigenvalue of ˜
′
(0) is equal
to 1, the set E is equal to the eigenspace of this largest eigenvalue. The eigenvector
centrality influence vector, which we denote ι, is the only element in this eigenspace
that satisfies the additional normalization condition
∑n
i=1 ιi = 1.
We are going to prove the following result.
Lemma 9. The limit of tβ(˜(t)) as t tends to 0 is a strictly positive vector, i.e., all its entries
are nonnegative and at least one of them is strictly positive.
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Proof. Let D−i = ∑j =i dij and Di(t) = td0ii + D−i. Define ˆ(t) as the matrix with en-
tries ωˆij(t) = dij/Di(t) for all i, j. (The difference with respect to ˜(t) is that it includes
the elements td0ii/Di(t) in the diagonal, which are zeros in ˜(t).) Note that by defi-
nition, ˆ(t) is a stochastic matrix for all t. Also define Diag(t) as the diagonal matrix
diag(D1(t)/d011    Dn(t)/d
0
nn). It immediately follows that
˜(t)= ˆ(t)− tDiag−1(t)
Hence, we obtain that
I− ˜(t) = I− ˆ(t)+ tDiag−1(t)
= (I+ tDiag−1(t))I− ˆ(t)
= (I+ tDiag−1(t)) · (I− (I+ tDiag−1(t))−1ˆ(t))
Therefore, we obtain that
(I− ˜(t))−1 = (I− (I+ tDiag−1(t))−1ˆ(t))−1 · (I+ tDiag−1(t))−1
The matrix (I+ tDiag−1(t))−1 is again a diagonal matrix, with entries equal to
(I+ tDiag−1(t))−1ii =
1
1+ td0iiDi(t)
= td
0
ii +D−i
2td0ii +D−i

Each of these diagonal entries tends to 1 when t tends to 0.
The matrix (I + tDiag−1(t))−1ˆ is bounded from below (entry by entry) by
(mini(td0ii + D−i)/(2td0ii + D−i))ˆ and it is bounded from above by (maxi(td0ii + D−i)/
(2td0ii +D−i))ˆ. Since all these matrices are nonnegative, this implies that(
I− (I+ tDiag−1(t))−1ˆ)−1 =∑
k≥0
[
(I+ tDiag−1(t))−1ˆ(t)]k
is bounded from below by
∑
k≥0
(
min
i
td0ii +D−i
2td0ii +D−i
)k
(ˆ(t))k
and bounded from above by
∑
k≥0
(
max
i
td0ii +D−i
2td0ii +D−i
)k
(ˆ(t))k
Remember that we want to show that the limit of t(I − ′(t))−11 as t tends to 0 is a
strictly positive vector (meaning that all its entries are nonnegative and at least one entry
is strictly positive). An alternative expression of this vector is
t(I+ tDiag−1(t))−1 · (I− ˆ′(t)(I+ tDiag−1(t))−1)−11
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We have proved before that (I + tDiag−1(t))−1 tends to the identity matrix, so we have
to focus on the limit of
t · (I− ˆ′(t)(I+ tDiag−1(t))−1)−11
We have
t
(∑
k≥0
(
min
i
td0ii +D−i
2td0ii +D−i
)k
ˆ
k
)
1 ≤ t · (I− (I+ tDiag−1(t))−1ˆ)−11
≤ t
(∑
k≥0
(
max
i
td0ii +D−i
2td0ii +D−i
)k
ˆ
k
)
1
Since ˆ is stochastic, we know that ˆ
k
1 = 1 for all k≥ 0. Therefore,
t
(
1
1− td0min+Dmin
2td0min+Dmin
)
1 ≤ t · (I− (I+ tDiag−1(t))−1ˆ)−11 ≤ t
(
1
1− td0max+Dmax
2td0max+Dmax
)
1
where we define Dmin and d0min (resp. max) as the values of D−i∗ and d
0
i∗i∗ for the i
∗ that
minimizes (resp. maximizes) (td0ii +D−i)/(2td0ii +D−i). If we premultiply all vectors by
1′ and take limits, we get that
n
Dmin
d0min
≤ lim
t→0
t1′ · (I− (I+ tDiag−1(t))−1ˆ)−1 · 1 ≤ nDmax
d0max

Given a square matrix X = (xij), we have that 1′ · X · 1 = ∑ij xij = ∑ij xij = 1′ · X′ · 1.
Therefore, the argument above shows that the limit of t1′ · (I− ˆ′(I+ tDiag−1(t))−1)−1 ·
1 as t tends to 0 is also bounded from below by n(Dmin/d0min) and from above by
n(Dmax/d
0
max). This means that the limit of t(I − ˆ
′
(I + tDiag−1(t))−1)−1 · 1 is a strictly
positive matrix and, therefore, the limit of t · ˆ′(I− (I+ tDiag−1(t))−1)−1 · 1 is a strictly
positive vector, as we wanted to show. (We are assuming here that Dmin is strictly posi-
tive; otherwise, the equilibrium of the game would entail no communication.) 
Step 3.
Lemma 10. The limit of tβ(t) as t tends to 0 is proportional to the eigenvector centrality
index.
Proof. Now define
S0 =
{
t ∈R s.t. det(I− ˜(t))= 0}
Note that 0 ∈ S0.
We know from the previous lemma that limt→0 tβ(t) exists and is a well defined
strictly positive vector. By definition, tβ(t) satisfies
(I− ˜′(t))tβ(t)= t1
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for all t ∈R \ S0. We can take limits at both sides of this equation to obtain
(I− ˜′(0))
(
lim
t→0
β(t)
)
= 0
This means that the limit vector limt βˆ(t) satisfies the condition that characterizes
the set E and, therefore, is proportional to the eigenvector centrality vector. 
Step 4. We are now ready to prove the statement of the theorem. From Lemma 8, we
know that
Ii =
n∑
j=1
βj(˜
′
(t))hji
Hence,
lim
t→0
Ii = lim
t→0
n∑
j=1
βj(˜
′
(t))hji
=
n∑
j=1
(
lim
t→0
tβj(˜
′
(t))
)(
lim
t→0
1
t
hji
)

In this case,
hji =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dii
dii+ 1t D−i
if i= j
−si 1t ( t
λkp√
djj+ 1t D−j
+ tλkr√
1
t dij
) otherwise.
When j = i, we have limt→0(1/t)hji if limt→0 t−1+λ+1/2 = 0, which is true because λ > 1.
Then we can write the limit of i’s influence as
lim
t→0
Ii = lim
t→0
tβj(˜
′
(t)) lim
t→0
1
t
dii
dii + 1t D−i
= lim
t→0
tβj(˜
′
(t)) lim
t→0
dii
tdii +D−i
=
(
lim
t→0
tβi(˜
′
(t))
) dii
D−i

We can now apply Lemma 10 to get the result:
lim
t→0
Ii(t)
Ij(t)
=
(
lim
t→0
tβi(˜
′
(t))
tβi(˜
′
(t))
) dii
D−i
djj
D−j
= ιi
ιj
dii
D−i
djj
D−j

Step 5. Theorem 1 requires that communication costs are sufficiently low so as to
have an interior solution. In the previous four steps, we operated under the assump-
tion that nonnegativity constraints are not binding. In this last step, we vindicate that
assumption by showing that when t approaches 0, we do not hit any boundary in the
actions and communication intensities decisions.
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Lemma 11. If the nonnegativity constraints on bi, r−i, and p−i are not binding for t = 1,
then they are not binding for any 0< t < t¯ for some t¯ ∈ (01).
Proof. Consider
u˜i(a)= −
(
dii(ai − θi)2 + 1
t
∑
j =i
dij(ai − aj)2 + tλk2r
∑
j =i
rji + tλk2p
∑
j =i
pij
)

To prove that bi does not hit a boundary condition, just note that when t tends
to 0, the vectors hi(t) converge to a nonnegative vector for all i. Since if djk > 0 for
all j = k, the matrix (I − ˜(t))−1 is strictly positive for all t ∈ (01), then the vector
(I− ˜(t))−1hj(t) is nonnegative if t is close to 0.
To prove interiority of active communication decisions, we can rewrite rij for each i,
j with i = j as
rij(t) =
√
dji
kr
bij
= (I− ˜(t))−1ij
√
dji
kr
djj
Dj
− sj
∑
l =j
(I− ˜(t))−1il
(
kp
kr
√
dji
Dj
+ 1
)
= (I− ˜(t))−1ij
[√
dji
kr
djj
Dj
− sj
∑
l =j
(I− ˜(t))−1il
(I− ˜(t))−1ij
(
kp
kr
√
dji
Dj
+ 1
)]

The first element (I−˜(t))−1ij tends to +∞ when t tends to 0. If λ is sufficiently large,
the first term in the expression in brackets is positive and tends to infinity as t tends to 0,
while the second term in brackets, which is negative, is bounded below because the ratio
(I− ˜(t))−1il
(I− ˜(t))−1ij
is positive and bounded as a consequence of Lemma 9 and the fact that (I− ˜(t))−1 is a
nonnegative matrix, and all its entries grow at the same rate if dij > 0 for all i = j.
Altogether, this proves that rij(t) tends to +∞ when t tends to 0. A similar argument
applies for the case of passive communication. This finishes the proof of the theorem.
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